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entitled to fifth amendment protection. As such documents are in reality more
in the nature of business records than private papers, they deserve no more
protection than the former have historically been afforded.
The failure to deal adequately with the privacy issue may effectively
preclude fifth amendment protection to virtually all documents. It is to be
hoped, however, that the Court will deal more fully with the privacy issue
when the documents in question are sufficiently private to be protected. Until
the Court has such an opportunity, Fisher should not be read as signaling the
end of the protection long provided private papers.
III. CONCLUSION
Cases prior to Fisher indicated that the fifth amendment protected indi-
viduals from being forced to produce incriminating documents when such
documents dealt purely with matters of private interest. What has been held
to constitute private interest, however, has been narrowed over the years to
exclude most collective and business-like entities. In Fisher the Supreme
Court held that an accountant's work papers in the possession of a client
would not be protected by the fifth amendment. Consequently, if the tax-
payer delivered those papers to his attorney, they would not be entitled to
protection under the attorney-client privilege. Although the Court reached
the proper conclusion, the opinion in Fisher, which virtually ignores an
important privacy issue, endangers fifth amendment protection heretofore
accorded to private papers.
Brian M. Lidji
The Petaluma Decision: Another Indication that Federal
Courts Want To Avoid Land Use Litigation
In 1972 Petaluma, California, a rapidly growing city' forty miles north of
San Francisco, implemented a growth control program2 which limited the
number of building permits issued through 1977, and established a 200-foot-
wide greenbelt which served as a boundary for urban expansion. The
Petaluma Plan prevented the construction of approximately one-half to two-
thirds of the housing units which would otherwise have been built in response
to the normal market demands. Two Petaluma landowners and an association
of builders and developers filed suit in federal court alleging that the Petaluma
1. In November 1972 the population was 30,500 and increasing at the rate of over 10% per
year.
2. The city council adopted an official development policy in June 1971 which reflected the
desire of Petaluma to limit its growth: "In order to protect its small town character and
surrounding open spaces, it shall be the policy of the City to control its future rate and distribution
of growth .... " Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 576 (N.D.
Cal. 1974). Petaluma also cited inadequate water and sewage treatment facilities as additional
reasons for the building limitation, but denied that a primary motive was to keep others from
moving into Petaluma. Id. at 576-77.
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Plan was unconstitutional. The district court invalidated the plan upon a
finding that it violated a constitutionally protected right to travel interstate.
The city of Petaluma appealed. Held, reversed: A builders' association and
landowners have no standing to assert the right to travel of third parties, and
the Petaluma Plan does not impermissibly burden interstate commerce. Con-
struction Industry Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 522 F.2d 897 (9th Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 1148, 47 L. Ed. 2d 342 (1976).
1. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Standing is a major element of the broader concept of justiciability3 by
which the jurisdiction of federal courts is defined. Standing, which has been
labeled an "amorphous" concept, 4 is contained within the framework of
article III of the Constitution which restricts judicial power to "cases" and
"controversies." 5 The Supreme Court, in the absence of a statute conferring
standing, has interpreted the article III limitation to require federal plaintiffs
to allege a threatened or actual injury to themselves before court jurisdiction
may be invoked. 6
An allegation of an injury in fact, however, is not sufficient to overcome the
prudential rule which denies standing to assert the constitutional rights of
third parties, the jus tertii claim.7 An analysis of the Supreme Court cases in
which standing to assert jus tertii has been granted shows that once either a
plaintiff or defendant has established an injury in fact, the Court considers
three factors which, taken together, determine whether or not standing to
assert jus tertii will be allowed:8 (1) the nature of the constitutional right
asserted ;9 (2) the nature of the relationship between the assailant and the third
party whose rights are being asserted ;1" and (3) whether it is practicable for the
3. The concept of justiciability is best defined by the question: "Should federal judicial
power be employed to hear this challenge by this litigant at this time?" Sedler, Standing,
Justiciability, and All That: A Behavioral Analysis, 25 VAND. L. REV. 479, 480 (1972).
4. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 98-99 (1%8); see Lewis, Constitutional Rights and the
Misuse of "Standing," 14 STAN. L. REV. 433, 434 (1962); Scott, Standing in the Supreme
Court-A Functional Analysis, 86 HARV. L. REV. 645 n.1 (1973); Note, Standing To Assert
Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974).
5. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 171 (1974); Association of Data Processing
Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
6. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,617 (1973); accord, Sierra Club v. Morton, 405
U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972).
7. A party attempting to assert a jus tertiiclaim must be harmed himself before the court will
consider allowing standing to assert the jus tertii claim. Compare, e.g., Tileston v. Ullman, 318
U.S. 44 (1943) (standing denied to physician seeking declaratory judgment that criminal statute
prohibiting dissemination of advice concerning use of contraceptives deprived patients of life
without due process), with Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (doctor criminally
prosecuted under anti-contraception statute given standing to assert the rights of his patients).
See Scott, supra note 4, at 649 n. 14; Sedler, Standing To Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 600 (1962); Note, supra note 4, at 429-31.
8. The discussion of the three factors is based largely upon Sedler, supra note 7, at 626-48.
9. The nature of the right can be placed into five categories, some of which are given a
higher status than others, depending upon a court's values: (1) expression; (2) life, liberty, and
privacy; (3) procedural rights; (4) property and contractual rights; and (5) equal protection. For
example, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), a private school challenged an
Oregon statute which required all children in a certain age group to attend public schools. The
Court, in permitting the jus tertii claim, held that the nature of the right asserted was a "funda-
mental theory of liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment which prohibited a state from
forcing children into public schools.
10. The several possible relationships, with varying degrees of importance to a court, are (1)
professional relationships, (2) race or class relationships, (3) commercial relationships, (4) the
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third party to assert its own rights.II In the latest major standing case, Warth
v. Seldin, 12 the Court denied standing to low income persons allegedly
excluded by a zoning ordinance.' 3 The Court defined a two-part injury in fact
test which was not met by the persons claiming to have been excluded: (1)
absent the restrictive zoning, those alleging exclusion must be able to pur-
chase or lease, and (2) if the court afforded the relief requested, those
claiming exclusion must be able to move into the town.14 In order to satisfy
this strict injury in fact requirement, the Warth Court indicated that those
allegedly excluded would have to challenge the zoning restrictions as applied
to particular housing projects within their means, and of which they were
intended residents.
15
In much the same state as the concept of standing, the current authority
construing the commerce clause of the United States Constitution is con-
fused. 16 Apparently, both federal and state courts are applying either a two-
step "reasonableness" analysis or a three-step balancing approach. The
two-step test was established in South Carolina State Highway Dep't v.
Barnwell Bros.,"' in which the Court upheld a state law setting size and weight
limits for trucks using state highways. The Court inquired whether the state
legislature had acted pursuant to a legitimate end and, if so, whether the
statute was reasonably adapted to that end. '8 The three-step balancing test is
best exemplified by Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona19 in which an Arizona law
limiting the length of trains was declared unconstitutional. The Court first
applied the Barnwell two-step analysis, but then went a step further by
relationship between a defendant and others also affected by a statute or process, and (5) the
relationship between an association and its members. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958),
points out the importance of the nature of the relationship. The Court held that an association,
which had been found in contempt of court for refusing to supply a membership list, had standing
to assert the rights of its members. The nature of the relationship between the association and its
members was strong because the members and the association were in a sense identical and the
association was the medium through which the members expressed their views. Id. at 458-59.
II. Sedler's analysis of jus tertii cases shows the practicability of third parties asserting their
own rights to be the most important of the three factors, although not itself controlling. Sedler,
supra note 7, at 628, 647; see Note, supra note 4, at 425. A jus tertii claim was permitted in
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), in which the claimant, who had been prosecuted for
distributing contraceptives to an unmarried woman, asserted that a law prohibiting the prescrip-
tion of contraceptives to unmarried persons violated the equal protection clause. The Court
found that persons denied access to contraceptives were not subject to prosecution, and,
therefore, were denied an opportunity to assert their own rights, thus "diluting" the rights of
third parties. Id. at 446.
12. 422 U.S. 490 (1975). For a full discussion of the case see Note, Constitutional Law-
Standing To Sue in Exclusionary Zoning Litigation: Catch-22 Revisited, 54 N.C.L. REV. 449
(1976); Note, Standing To Sue-Injury in Fact Guidelines for Constitutional Challenges of Zoning
Ordinances by Nonresidents, 9 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 944 (1975).
13. Although the case is not an important jus tertii case, the injury in fact requirements are
significant to the Petaluma decision. See notes 30-32 infra and accompanying text.
14. 422 U.S. at 504.
15. Id. at 507.
16. For an excellent analysis of the evolution of commerce clause cases see D. ENGDAHL,
CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: FEDERAL AND STATE 260-94 (1974); Note, Use of the Commerce Clause
to Invalidate Anti-Phosphate Legislation: Will It Wash?, 45 U. COLO. L. REv. 487 (1974).
17. 303 U.S. 177 (1938). For an analysis of cases decided since Barnwell see D. ENGDAHL,
supra note 16, at 283-86.
18. 303 U.S. at 190.
19. 325 U.S. 761 (1945). For other cases applying the balancing test see Bibb v. Navajo
Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (transportation); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)
(trade); New York Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346 (1939) (trade).
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balancing the effectiveness of the safety measure against its interference with
interstate commerce. 20
The current confusion in the case law was aggravated by opinions in two
recent Supreme Court cases. One clearly rejected balancing and applied the
Barnwell test, 2' while the other used somewhat hazy balancing language. 22 It
remains unclear in both federal 23 and state24 courts whether judicial scrutiny
should defer to local legislation under the Barnwell approach, or whether a
stricter scrutiny and an active balancing test should apply.
II. CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY ASS'N V.
CITY OF PETALUMA
The circuit court found that both the builders' association and the land-
owners were injured in fact. 25 The Court held, however, that the right to travel
claim fell within the prudential standing rule that bars parties from asserting
the rights or legal interests of others in order to obtain relief for themselves .26
Consequently, appellees had standing to assert only those rights personal to
them: that the plan posed an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce
and was violative of their due process rights. 27
20. 325 U.S. at 775-76.
21. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968)
(Arkansas "full-crew" train law upheld in deference to legislative judgment of elected
representatives).
22. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970) (Arizona fruit packing regulation
imposed greater burden on interstate commerce than resulting local benefits).
23. See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975). But see Soap & Detergent Ass'n v. Clark, 330 F. Supp. 1218, 1221-22 (S.D.
Fla. 1971).
24. Hackensack Meadowlake Dev. Comm'n v. Municipal Sanitary Landfill Authority, 68
N.J. 451, 348 A.2d 505 (1975), prob. juris. noted, 44 U.S.L.W. 3564 (U.S. Apr. 6, 1976) (No.
1150). Here the court recognized the two possible tests, but elected to apply a balancing test to
uphold a state law prohibiting the disposal of out-of-state solid waste in New Jersey. But see
American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Ore. App. 618, 517 P.2d 691 (1973)
(court refused to apply balancing in upholding ban on non-returnable beverage containers).
25. 522 F.2d at 903. The builders contributed dues to the association in a sum that was
proportionate to the amount of business done in the area. Therefore, the court found that the
building restrictions arguably caused economic injury to the association, thus satisfying injury in
fact. See note 6 supra and accompanying text. The allegation by the two landowners that the
building restrictions adversely affected the value and marketability of their land was sufficient to
establish a personal stake in the litigation. 522 F.2d at 903-04.
26. Id. at 904.
27. Id. at 905. The circuit court dealt with three major areas of constitutional law in
upholding the Petaluma Plan: standing, the commerce clause, and due process. For a discussion
of due process challenges of land use regulation see Comment, "Takings" Under the Police
Power-The Development of Inverse Condemnation as a Method of Challenging Zoning Ordi-
nances, p. - supra.
The decision to deny standing to the developers to assert the right to travel was the key holding
as it permitted the court to shift from the compelling interest test used by the lower court to a
reasonableness test, a shift enabling the court to uphold the plan. In the most recent cases
concerning a right to travel the Supreme Court has held that the right is a fundamental one which
may be abridged only upon a showing of compelling state interest. These cases have held that a
denial of a basic necessity of life which penalizes the exercise of the right to travel denies equal
protection in the absence of a compellihg state interest. Hospitalization and welfare payments are
necessities of life, but divorce and education are not. Compare, e.g., Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250,259 (1974) (durational residency requirement as a condition to an
indigent's receiving non-emergency hospitalization violated equal protection clause), and Shap-
iro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (durational residency requirement as a condition to
receiving welfare payments violated equal protection clause), with Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
405-09 (1975) (state residency requirement for divorce upheld), and Starns v. Malkerson, 326 F.
Supp. 234, 238 (D. Minn. 1970), affl'd, 401 U.S. 985 (1971) (requirement of one-year domicile for
residence eligibility of out-of-state student upheld).
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In reaching the decision to bar the jus tertiiclaim, the circuit court found the
appellees' claims met none of the exceptions which permit jus tertii standing.
In particular, there existed no special relationship between appellees and
those allegedly excluded, 28 nor had the association and landowners shown
that those allegedly excluded could not assert their own rights. 29 The circuit
court's conclusions seem well-founded in the light of the earlier jus tertii
cases, 30 and in concert with the Supreme Court's orientation toward standing
and zoning challenges as evidenced by Warth.
Unlike Warth, in Petaluma no persons allegedly excluded from Petaluma
were parties to the suit. The Warth standing requirement is important, how-
ever, as it indicates what degree of relationship must exist between third
parties and those attempting to assert jus tertii claims. The association was
required by the Warth decision to allege that the Petaluma Plan interfered
with a specific housing project of an association member and that a specific,
intended buyer or lessee was prevented, thereby, from moving into Petaluma
to reside in that particular project. Thus, the association's general claim that
the plan denied the right to travel, insofar as the plan tended to limit the
natural population growth of the area, did not establish the degree of relation-
ship necessary under Warth.
The most important factor in allowing jus tertii claims is a showing that the
third party cannot assert its own rights.3' An analysis of Warth indicates the
weakness of the association's jus tertii claim in Petaluma. In Warth the
several persons allegedly excluded did assert their own rights and interests.
There was no reason why those actually excluded from Petaluma could not
have done the same. 32
Although the Court in Petaluma reached the proper jus tertii decision, it
seemed at one point to confuse the jus tertii issue with a line of cases dealing
with the zone of interest requirement.33 The zone of interest requirement is of
The city of Petaluma claimed three compelling interests to support the dwelling unit limitation,
the most significant of which was the desire of its citizens to protect the "small town character"
of Petaluma. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 583 (N.D. Cal.
1974). The district court adopted the reasoning of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to deny that
preserving the character of a city can ever be a compelling interest. Id. at 584-86. See National
Land & Inv. Co. v. Kohn, 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966) (zoning restrictions requiring
minimum area per residential building lot cannot be used to avoid the sewage, traffic, and
overcrowding caused by natural growth); Note, The Right To Travel as a Limitation upon the
Exercise of the Zoning Power, 36 OHIo ST. L.J. 128, 134-37 (1975).
The exact parameters of the right to travel have not been determined in the equal protection
field. The important point is that the district court applied the right to travel in a zoning context for
the first time; it had been raised only once in a zoning case heard by the Supreme Court, but the
Court did not discuss the issue to any extent. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I
(1974). See also Note, Construction Indus. Ass'n of Sonoma County v. City of Petaluma:
Constitutional Limitations Placed on Controlled Growth Zoning, 5 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 485
(1975); Note, Freedom of Travel and Exclusionary Land Use Regulations, 84 YALE L.J. 1564,
1574-75 (1975).
28. 522 F.2d at 904.
29. Id.
30. See notes 7-11 supra and accompanying text.
31. See note I I supra.
32. 522 F.2d at 904-05.
33. Id. at 904. The zone of interest requirement arose in two earlier cases. Association of
Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (competitor's interest against
national banks entering data processing field was within zone of interest of statutory protection);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970) (tenant farmers who were eligible to receive cotton
program payments were within zone of interest and could challenge statute which permitted
assignment of payments to secure tenant rent).
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uncertain importance at this time in the law of standing.34 Whatever its
relevance, the zone of interest test is at most an additional requirement to
injury in fact and has little to do with the law of jus tertiiclaims with which the
Petaluma case was primarily concerned.
The circuit court ignored the current dissension surrounding the proper
commerce clause test. The district court found that the housing in Petaluma
was constructed from goods and services which had moved in interstate
commerce, and that the curtailment of residential growth by the plan would
cause a serious burden on interstate commerce.35 The court dismissed the
commerce clause claim with no analysis, and, furthermore, did not deal with
the trial court's finding of fact that the plan unreasonably burdened interstate
commerce. 36 Rather than analyze the commerce claim, the court quoted the
language of Huron Cement Co. v. Detroit,37 a case in which the Supreme Court
apparently applied the Barnwell two-step reasonableness test, and stated that
it was beyond its authority "to review state legislation by balancing reason-
able social welfare legislation against its incidental burden on commerce." 3"
Ironically, the circuit court rejected the balancing approach as though there
were no question as to its demise or inapplicability in Petaluma, but cited a
Seventh Circuit case which admitted the uncertainty as to whether the Barn-
well approach or the balancing approach should be used. 39
The foregoing arguments only serve to emphasize what many authorities
have suggested: the state courts are the better forum for challenges to land
use regulation.' The Petaluma decision may encourage this attitude. State
courts will scrutinize the local plans with reference to regional needs, taking
into account the particular economic and social facts of an entire region and
mandating that local plans promote the regional welfare. This level of stricter
scrutiny in state courts will primarily focus on suitable housing for all classes
of people, and invalidate growth control plans which do not provide low and
moderate income housing.4 Thus, in state courts developers, associations,
34. In Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations v. Camp the Court added a
second requirement for standing by requiring a complainant seeking standing to be arguably
within the zone of interests to be protected by the statute or constitutional right in question. 397
U.S. at 153.
35. Construction Indus. Ass'n v. City of Petaluma, 375 F. Supp. 574, 577-81 (N.D. Cal.
1974).
36. 522 F.2d at 909.
37. 362 U.S. 440 (1960). The Court in Huron stated "that a police power does not impermiss-
ibly burden interstate commerce where the regulation neither discriminates against interstate
commerce nor operates to disrupt its required uniformity." 362 U.S. at 448.
38. 522 F.2d at 909, citing Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
R.R., 393 U.S. 129, 136 (1968).
39. Procter & Gamble Co. v. City of Chicago, 509 F.2d 69 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
978 (1975). The court in Petaluma apparently ignored the uncertainty expressed in Procter &
Gamble in order to apply only a reasonableness test. This treatment of the commerce clause issue
was consistent with the denial of standing to assert the right to travel which, if allowed and
deemed a fundamental interest, would have required a test of strict scrutiny.
40. First, state courts have greater experience in dealing with local land use regulation.
Secondly, standing is more readily attained in state courts where the plaintiffs are not confronted
with the constitutional "case" or "controversy" requirement which, after Warth, makes it
extremely difficult for those claiming to have been excluded to gain standing. Finally, and
perhaps most important for those challenging the regulations, state courts may impose a stricter
test than the federal courts' reasonableness standards. See Hall, Planners Alerted to Coming
Increase in Land Use Litigation in Four Types of Cases, 10 A.I.P. NEWSLETTER, Nov.-Dec. 1975,
at 9.
41. The leading state case on the concept of regional welfare is Southern Burlington County
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and landowners will not be forced to assert jus tertii claims in order to place a
challenged ordinance under a stricter scrutiny than the reasonableness tests
applied by federal courts.
III. CONCLUSION
The Petaluma decision was neither surprising nor novel. This decision
again evidences the basic unwillingness of federal courts to become involved
in local land use regulation. The effect of cases such as Petaluma may be to
force those challenging local land use regulations to bring suit in state, not
federal courts.
Michael D. Wortley
NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (local zoning ordinance invalidated on ground that it did not promote
regional welfare as it provided for no range of housing types). See Williams & Doughty, Studies in
Legal Realism: Mount Laurel, Belle Terre and Berman, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 73 (1975).
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